Compañeros,
En nuestra próxima sesión del 17 de abril, Melina Gastelum nos presentará el texto “Cognitive Penetration and Nonconceptual Content” – de Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow). Mismo horario: 15:30 a 17:30
Aquí el resumen del texto:
This paper seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. Cognitive penetration occurs when oneʼs beliefs or desires affect oneʼs perceptual experience, at least in certain ways that I make precise in the paper. I examine two different models of cognitive penetration and four different accounts of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. I argue that whether cognitive penetration and nonconceptual content are compatible is sensitive to the model of cognitive penetration that one is considering and the account of nonconceptual content that one has in mind. I argue that one model of cognitive penetration—“classic” cognitive penetration—is compatible with only one of the accounts of nonconceptual content that I identify. I then consider the other model of cognitive penetration—cognitive penetration “lite”. I provide reasons to think that this is compatible with three accounts of nonconceptual content. Moreover, I argue that the account of nonconceptual content that it is not compatible with is a spurious notion of nonconceptual content that ought to be abandoned. Thus, I claim that cognitive penetration lite is compatible with all reasonable specifications of nonconceptual content.
Los esperamos!